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Abstract
This thesis is the study of the effects of public opinion
on the growth of labor unions as expressed by two prominent
newspapers, the New York Times and the Ohicago Tribune.

The

period studied, 1945-1948 .. preceeded a significant drop in the
union growth rate.

Excerpts in which editorial opinion was

clearly expressed were chosen.

The work is divided into three

}

broad categories of events; the post-war strike waves and the
resultant anti-union legislation constitute the first two
I

categories.

The third tactor studied was the effect of

Communist infiltration on public opinion in trade unions.

The

previously mentioned areas of study, plus a more general survey
of other social and economic

fa~tors

influencing union growth

indicate that anti-union public selltiment gained strength until
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, whereupon public
sentiment altered its course, becoming passive, if not
sympathetic.
This thesis constitutes a portion of a study of union
growth undertaken by the Institute of Industrial Relations.

OHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The human response to an existing mood in society is
action through a formalized structure, i.e., an organization.
Although goals and action usually identify an organization,
the composition or size of the membership may also be identifying characteristics.

The shifting trends of memberships in

human organizations are, therefore, avidly studied by those
interested in the changing sooial and eoonomic scene.
Membership rosters may ebb or swell at various times
indicating the strength of the reaction from various seotors of
the publio in response to the performance ot the organization
in question.

Reasons tor such changes are certainly ot interest

to the leaders of a group, to stUdents of an organization, and
in certain instanoes, to the general publio.

In the case ot

organized labor the former three categories are well defined.
Labor leaders are oertainly very eager to learn what causes a
rise of decline in the membership roles ot unions.

The public

in general oan be said to have a certain degree of interest in
labor unions. however, that portion ot society employing
laborers 1s greatly concerned about the activities ot union
organizers and the resulting effects.
1

Students of organized

2
labor have devoted much energy to answering the questions
encountered in examining the growth of unions.

Many theori.s

have been preponded in an attempt to relate the growth to
specific factors.
The purpose of this project is to explore the relationship
between a single factor, public opinion, and the growth of
organized labor.

The effect ot public opinion on union growth
was indicated by John Dunlopl and Joseph Shister. 2 Specifically. the intent of this thesis is to examine the ettects of
public opinion on union growth during the period 1945 to 1948.
The selection ot a three year span is in conformity with the
study presently being conducted by the Institute ot Industrial
Relations on the determinants of union growth and the concomitant variation in union membership.

The year 1948 marks a

substantial change in union growth, as compared to the years
immediately preceed1ng and succ.eding the year 1948.' The
events prior to this year are being studied to provide insight
into the reasons why the downturn occurred.
The historical data tor the period has been compiled trom
the works ot noted labor economists and historians.

The

IJobn f. Dunlop, "The Development ot Labor Organizations,"
in I98!fht into Labor Issues, ed. Lester and Shister, 1948,

p.

1

91.

2Joseph Shister, "Th. LogiC ot Union Growth," Journal of
Political Economl t Oct., 195', p. 41~14.
'Handbook of Labor Statistics.
1965. p. 345.

ot Labor StatIstIcs,

Washington, D.C.,

Bureau

3
information on union membership for these years is based on a
study performed by Irving Bernstein4 who t in turn, established
his examination principally trom an unpublished analysis done
by Leo Wolman.

The union growth factors have been developed by

Joseph Shister, Irving Bernstein, and John Dunlop. and further
refined by Julius Rezler.
The bulk of the research has been comprised through an
analysis of the editorial attitudes of two influential dai11es.
the N,w !ork Tim!s and the Qhioaso Tribune.

The ••thod of this

study is to examine and interpret the editorial attitude as
expressed through editorials, signed articles. and letters to
the editor. 5 News articles were not used since they do Dot
exhibit editorial opinion and should not do so.

Editorials and

signed articles on the other hand are recognized by their critiCism, advice, and tone, instead ot unbiased news reporting.

The

New YOEk Tim!. provides an Index of material published in that
newspaper which facilitated the location ot pertinent data.
The articles reviewed were those contained under the headings of
"labor" and "labor unions."

The

research ot editorial attitudes

ot the Tribunl required a scrutiny Ot the dally publication for
4Irving Bernstein, "The Growth ot American Unions."
Am,ricAA Ec2DOrQc Rev!eth June. 1954-. p. :;04.

5It is reoognized by the author that letters to the editor
may appear at the whim of the editor. However, some letters
direotly opposed to the opinions expressed in the paper seem to
express qualitative if not quantitative reactions ot the
readers.

4
the tour year period.

All articles relating to organized labor

or the labor movement in general were read.

The use of sampling

was eliminated by the scrutiny of all material related to the
thesis topic as published by the two newspapers.

Selection ot

the exerpts appearing in the thesis was based prinCipally on the
fact that they. aore than the others, expressed a definite point
of view rather than reporting tactual information. .The newspaper was chosen as an indicator ot public opinion because it
has established its role as more than a purveyor ot social,
political. and economic information.

It is also a barometer

which can inhibit or compel social action.

For the purpose ot

this thesis we must assume the premise. that editorials and
letters to the editors reflect the public opinion as related to
union growth and the issues involved therein.
However, to elaborate on the basis ot selection, we might
note that these two newspapers enjoy a large circulation in
their respective geographic regions, which becomes increasingly
important when one considers the huge union membership in
New York and Ohicago.

Newspapers of other regions were not

chosen tor various reasons; however, let it suffice to say that
union concentration in these two cities is substantial and that
other geographic regions have commonly been beset by relatively
local problems.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the two

newspapers utilized have already provided the basis for
previous research done at the Institute of Industrial Relations

5
in the thesis "Editorial Attitude toward Unionism with regard to
Important Labor Issues, the Years 1914-1921 Inclusive," by
Eugene Monroe.
The only other work of similar nature, to the writer's
knowledge, is a thesis by Anthony Brzyski done at New York
University for the Economies Department, entitled "Editorial
Policy of the Itw York Time! to Labor,

19~O-l94?n

CHAPTER II

GENERAL BACKGROUND
The increasingly important role played by organized labor
in the twentieth century constantly generates interest for
students of American labor, as indicated by one scholar of the
labor movement:
Of the organizations which stand in the foreground of
our modern society, none i8 regarded and analyzed with
more interest and anxiety than the labor union because
of its fUnctions and the political and economic power
it exercises • .1
The concern of this paper is a short span of time in the
history ot union growth, narrowed by only one faotor .. that ot
the influence ot public opinion.

Although the period of

immediate concern of this paper is the four year span immediately following the war, a brief disoussion of the pre-war period
might provide some interesting background information.

With the

coming of the New Deal came a. redress of the balance of power on
the union and management seale in favor ot the unions.

It was

generally acknowledged by the public and its representatives in
Washington that labor legislation relatively favorable to
lJulius Resler, Union Growth Reconsidered
Kossuth Foundation. Inc •• 19SI), p. 1.
'

6

(New York:

The
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unions would serve to improve labor relations; therefore, a
series ot measures were adopted between 1933 and 1938. 2 In
retrospect the major piece ot legislation of this era was the
Wagner Act of 1935.

Legislation plus a tremendous organiZing

spurt during the latter halt of the 1930's, during which the
automobile and steel industries were organized. gave organised
labor a new position in society.
It must be noted. however. that organizing such large
portions ot the labor torce produced a certain amount of strite
and industrial disputes.

The public discontent that arose at

this time was not immediately dealt with, however, because ot
President:Roosevelt's convictions,

In spite ot both labor disturbances and a growing
demand tor modification of the Wagner Act, however,
Roosevelt was to remain convinced that the increased
strength of unions would in time lead to greater
industrial stability.'
The inception ot World War II created an atmosphere of
nationalism in the United States which probably has not been
equaled since.

National defense needs required the pledge ot

loyalty from both labor and management.

This is not to say

that either party gave up any intentions of protecting its
interests during the period.

However. the short supply ot

labor 1n certain areas torced employers to deal with unions,
Y.

2Foster Rhea Dulles Labor in America (New York:
Crowell Company t 19603 .-p;;;;;';;'.~~iirlBb""'"'"."""'iiiiiiii.ij;""""""""""·
'Dulles, p. 287.

Thomas
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bringing unions and managements into closer relationships and
resting a stabilized membership.4
The War Labor Board was created by President Roosevelt 1n
January of 1942 to provide a meeting ground tor management and
labor and to avoid untavorable legislation pending in Oongress.
Initially, labor was pleased with the War Labor Board. largely
because of its approval of union security.

It created the

maintenance of membership shop through which the union could
keep diSCipline throughout the term of the contract.

A provi-

sion was also made to protect the rights of individual members
by allowing them a fifteen day escape hatch at which time they
could withdraw trom the union.
The assurance ot industrial peace initiated by the maintenance of membership clause was offset within a few months by the

-Little Steel Formula."

Due to the demands of the employees of

the so-called Little Steel Oompanies (Republic. National,
Youngstown). the War Labor Board created a formula that was to
become the guiding principle tor wage determination throughout
the wartime period.

According to this formula. wage adjustments

were not to exceed a fifteen per cent rise in cost of living
from January 1, 1941. to May 1. 1942.

Although wages certainly

remained stable while wartime price controls were in force,
labor used its ingenuity.

York:

Fringe benefits were sought by

4philip Taft. or~nized Labor in American Ristor:
Harper & Row,
hilshers, 19&4', p. 536.

(New
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organized labor and were severely restricted by the War Labor

Board in order to avoid worker protests.

Even though the War

Labor Board was not popular in labor circles, it did accomplish
its mammoth task with perspiouity:
Between January 12, 1942, and August 18, 1945, the
National War Labor Board closed 17,650 dispute cases
involving approximately 12.2 m1l1ion workers. In
over 95 per cent of these cases, the decision of the
Board and its agents resolved the dis~ute without
without~.rurth.r threat to production.?
The labor picture was a relatively favorable one during
the war; hov.ever.. strikes did occur, otten putting the war
effort in peril according to the press; the coal strikes were
considered to be especially reprehensible.
The Smith-Connally Aot was passed over President Roosevelt's veto in an effort to restrict strikes.
a thirty day notice tollowed by a strike vote.

It provided tor
As a tinal

measure, it also provided for plant seizure if the strike
interfered with the war effort.

Nevertheless, the effect of the

bill was to bureaucratize striking instead of diminishing the
incidence of strikes.
Organized labor ellierged from the war as a solidified and
respectable segment of society.

Labor's cooperation and

achievements were praised by military leaders as well as
political leaders.
laurels.

Nevertheless, unions did not rest on their

It was obvious that both managements and organized

10

labor had come out of the war determined to rectify the injustices that each party felt it had suffered because of the wage
and price stabilization.

Both industry and organized labor

were psychologically and financially prepared to battle it out.
Jaster Rhea Dulles, the historian, stated that besides feeling
deprived of their respective rights as a result ot war-time
controls, both parties had grown rusty in the practice of
colleotive bargaining. 6
By

the end of 1945 the War Labor Board was dissolved in

favor of the National Wage Stabilization Board. 7 ~he function
of this tripartite agenoy, composed of management, labor. and
govera-ent leaders, was the indirect control at wages and
prices.

Nevertheless. the war had officially ended some months

before and organized labor felt it was time to demand its due.
fhe strike wave broke with a resounding crash.

Four of the

largest sectors of organized labor almost simultaneously made
demands. all of whioh resulted in work stoppages, beginning with
the automobile workers dispute to the steel workers strike, the
coal strike and the railroad strike.

fhe result at these

strikes, ocourring simultaneously. was a show of tremendous
power in the hands of unions.

The public was shocked, but.

6Dulles. p. 357.
?Many of the observations made in the following survey ot
facts will be documented later in the paper as they appear in
the form of direct quotations.
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with the economy in a state of turmoil and civilian post-war
resources not yet assessed, organized labor had the obvious
advantage.
Although all factions of society seemed to be clamoring

tor the removal ot wage and price controls, the actual removal
of oontrols on November 9, 1946, signaled a seoond round ot
industrial disputes.

The United Auto Workers again led the

fight for higher wages by striking first.

The railroad workers,

ooal miners, and telephone workers soon following suit.

Th.

seoond round of labor disputes, following so closely on the
heels of the first round, enraged the publio.

The nation had

not totally recovered from the disorder caused by wartime oonditions and was not about to endure what were felt to be
unneoessary hardships.

Other issues suoh as Portal-to-Portal

pay demands added tat to the fire. because it seemed that labor
was not satisfied to bargain collectively.

Many court cases

were ooming to light in which workers olaimed pay for time
spent preparing tor the job on the premises.

The publio

demanded a law to curb labor's powerful demands.

The House of

Representatives prepared a punitive bill whioh would have taken
indu$trial relations baok to the beginning of the twentieth
oentury.

The Senate produced a bill curbing union power. but it

did not contain punitive measures ad did the former bill.

The

Labor-Management Relations Act. which was a composite ot the
Senate and House bills, was passed into law on June

2'.

1947.
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Labor leaders called it a slave-labor bill and vowed to fight
it.

The public seemed to have tasted revenge sufficiently and

decided to reduce pressure on its representatives in Washington
atter the Act went into effect a few months later.

Some of the

Clauses of the Taft-Hartley Act were readily apparent to be
doomed to failure.

The trend ot thought seemed to have been

that labor had gone too far in its demands. but that the TattHartley Act would n.ot be a satisfactory solution either.
o! the provisions were recognized as "unworkable;"

Some

others were

considered repugnant and insulting to unions, the case in point
being the communist aff1davit.

Since other organizations 1n

American society were not required to sign such affidavits,
unions shouted cries of discrimination.

The charge of

"Communist" was often rightly applied to certain labor union
during this period; however, the accusation was often unjustly
applied to other unions.
The year 1948 was anti-climactic in comparison to the
previous year; after labor's initial shock. the Taft-Hartley Act
was found to be tolerable in practice if not in theory.

The

Democratic Party, however, regretted its hasty censure of
organized labor and promised to rectify the inequity of the
situation if unions would support the Democratic Party in the
next election.

The unions found the use of political pressure

to be advantageous.

Organized labor took advantage of its

newly discovered position as a political pressure group instead

l}

of using the initially contemplated more violent measures such
as strikes.
materialized.

The threatened third wave of strikes never

CHAPTER III
WAGE DEMANDS .AND STRIKES
The first wave
The post-war period brought more problems than anticipated.
The predicted unemployment problem occurred immediately alter
V-J Day.

Certain segments of the public, apparently calloused

by the war, did not view the unemployment situation as partiou-

larly troublesome to the economy as a whole with little thought
of vital needs of the men returning from the war.

The TriPMne

editorialized along the following lines:
With plenty of manpOwer. plenty of raw materials, and
greatly expanded production capacity. we don't need
to fear inflation.
The New York Times, on the other hand, expressed concern
over the unemployment 8ituation.:
Much is being said as to what the government ought to
give to labor during the forthcoming period ot reconversion unemployment. Little is being said as to how
to speed the reconversion period and enable industr,y
to reabsorb those who have been or w11l be rebased
from war work and those wbo p~esently will be taking
otf their military uniforms. 2
lehicaso Tribun~t September 9. 1945. p. 12.

2~ew York Times, September 3, 1945, p. 22.
14
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:r'he severity of unemployment became more evident ss indicated by the statistics on unemployment gathered by the Census
Bureau and reported by the N!w York Times:
It is estimated that in the week of August 5-11 there
were 830,000 unemployed and that for the week Of;
September 2-8 there was an increase of 900.000.
The publio seemed for the most part to be in sympathy with
the working man's problems at this time; this letter to the
Tim!1 exhibits such concern:
In a recent editorial you opposed unemployment compensation for Federal workers. I wonder if you have any
conception of the suffering in the ranks--of those who,
having worked long hours for four years with inadequate
pay. now find themselves suddenly without jobs. 4
The editorial answer to the letter indicated a misunderstanding
on the part

or

the reader; however, it does show public concern

on the problem of economic hardship and unemployment.
unemployment problem

The

for the most part temporary, however.

WaS

due to disorder in the labor market rather than to a shortage
of jobs.

As this issue solved itself. the true ooncern of

unions became obvious.

~hel

felt it was high time to reap some

of the rewards gained by their employers due to high war-time
production.

The public was not in sympathy with organised

labor on the issue ot wage increases. although, it could
certainly be said to haye

been on the side of organized labor

'New YgriT1!es, September 25, 1945, p. 15,
4Bew Ygrk Tim,s. October 12, 1945. p. 22.
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in its efforts to avoid unemployment.

The differenoe in the

public attitude toward unemployment and the wage issue is
readily apparent when one considers the effect of both issues on
the public.

In the unemployment issue the public could afford

to be noble and demand employment for everyone.

However, they

were not so eager to concur with the workers' desire for higher
wages it this led to strikes and

perh~ps

higher prices.

As long

as benefits given to workers were not at the expense of the
pub1ic t s pooketbook, they certainly could afford to be
righteous.

The Trl,bune expressed what seemed to be the general

tenor ot publio thought on this issue:
What was needed was the prompt expansion ot the production ot goods, moderation in wage demands, and
eco.nomy in government." ••• The idea that there can be
increased wages without increases in prices is
nonsense. 5
The ilia'. ,xpressed i'ts opposl tion to raising wages in an
editorial:

But while the basic wage rates during the war increased
from January. 1941. by only 20 per cent, average hourly
earnings increased 53 per cent and average weekly
earnings. 7? per cent. It is this last increase that
unions are trying to freeze, though in the same period
the Government figures show an increase in the cost-ofliving index of only 28 per cent. 6
Although the government received a great deal of criticism
on its handling ot the post-war economy. it had little other
50hlcaso Tribun!. December 4. 1945. p. 12.

6 New York T~mes. September 17, 1945. p. 18.
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recourse.

The government was first of all unprepared to

replace wartime wage and price controls with mOdified peacetime
controls and unwilling to abandon controls completely.

Labor

unions, on the other hand, were not willing to wait for the
government to act.
The President attempted to conciliate unions and managements by appointing neutral fact-finding boards to settle wage
disputes.

The decisions of the boards were in most cases

unsatisfactory to both parties.

The major management

ob~ection

was to discussions by either the government or unions ot its
ability to pay. which it felt to be an infringement on its
right to manage and its privacy.

Unions felt the ability to

pay should be a matter of disoussion beoause of greatly
increased industrial profits.

The noted labor eoonomist, Joel

Seidman, backed labor's position with this observation:

• Under

the influenoe of rising prices, high levels of production and
salest and diminished taxes. corporate profits were soaring to
the highest point in the history of the country."?

General

Seoretary-Treasurer Julius Emspak (of the United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America) concurred with this outlook in a letter to the Time, remarking on the negative outcome
of growing profits.

"Despite glowing profit reports, the cost

?Joel Seidman, American Labor trom Defense toieconversion
(Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 195~), p. 241.
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of living continues to mount in an inflationary crescendo. oS
Nevertheless. both unions and the public demanded an economy
tree of government controls.

Professor Charles J. Walsh ot

Fordham University wrote to the Time! advocating a hastened
return to a normal state of affairs.

He noted that an economy

which is half tree and half controlled is necscient. 9 The
controls were finally removed because of pressure from all
parties concerned and because the government felt that widespread unemployment would counteract excessive wage increases. 10
Price increases wbicb occurred after tbe lifting of controls had tbe effect of wiping out earlier real wage gains made
by unions.

ManJ appraisals of the cost of living and wage-

price issues were being made by all parties concerned. the
government, unions. and management.
more notoriety than any other.

The Nathan survey gained

According to Joel Seidman:

The 010 relied heavily on an economic analysis made
tor it by Robert R. Nathan and his aSSOCiates, who
argued that a substantial wage increase without a
general price increase was possible. justifiable.
and essential from the point ot view ot t~e economy
as a whole as well as that ot the ind1*idual worker.
Nathan asserted tbat as 23 per cent increase was
required to bring l'e~weeklY earningstJaek to the
January, 1945. level.

8N!~ York Time!. October 11, 1946. p. 22.
9Niw Yo,k T~!St October 20, 1946, p. 12, IV.
lOTatt. p. 564.
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Another academician, Professor John Black of Harvard University,
found the Nathan report to be detrimental to the economyt it
He predicted a spiral ot wage increases resulting in
an economic crash. l2

followed.

When all wage and price controls were removed, unions saw
their chance to make up for what they felt they had lost during
the war.

Similar thinking on the part ot management, however,

resulted in irreconcilable goals and a strong emotional involvement ot each party attempting to rectity the situation.
Professor Seidman summarily described the situation in these
words.
While protits were higb bet ore mass unemployment undercut labor's bargaining power--now was the time, unions
believed, to torce wage rates up to compensate for the
loss of overtime earnings. Where tactionalism or rival
unionism existed, success would go toctbe group that
produoed wage increases while the opportunity existed.
Moreover] what about the employers who had yielded to
the War Labor Board under pressure who had not yet
reconciled themselves to unionism and COllective bargaining? They would not abide by War Labor Board
decisions now that the hostilities were over, and public opinion would hardly support the President in plant
seizures. the only weapon ot entorcement. A labor
leader who talked ot a no-strike pledge under S~gh circumstances was inviting repudiation and defeat. ,
The early months of 1946 were appraised by the

~ew

York

Times in this statement: "strike has tollowed strike during the
past tew months ••• • 14 Supporting this point of view, Ph1lip~t
12New YO£k Times, December 17. 1946. p. ~O.
l3Seidmant p.

217.

l4New York Times. May 4. 1946. p. 10.
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had the following observation to make:
This was the beginning ot a twelve-month series ot
labor-management conflicts unmatched tor their 'scope
and intensity' in any comparable period in American
history_ In the period between August 15, 1945, and
August 14, 1946, 4,6~O work stoppages took place.
They involved 4.9 million workers who lost 119.8
million man-days otlwork, or 1.62 per ce~t of all work
time in the period. ::>
' •.
There were actually two obviou$ waves of strikes.

The

first round occurred in the winter of 1945-46, and the second
occurred the following winter, 1946-47.
were led by large and influential unions.

Both waves of strikes
An article by

Louis Stark observed that the "squeaking axle gets the greas.~16
The author cited the railroad. coal. and auto workers· unions
as the most clamorous. militant, and greedy.

The benefits pro-

duced by the strikes were far reaching momentarily because they
set standards for smaller industries and unions to follow.
However, their effect on the public and government caused a
whiplash efrect.

The public used its only sure weapon against

the united front of labor unions; it retaliated by supporting
anti-labor legislation.

The strikes which produced this ettect

received much public attention.

The editorial comments were

constant and unanimous in asserting that unions were demanding
unjust wage increases.

Joseph Rayback concisely characterized

the attitude of the people during this turbulent post-war

15!ratt, p. 56? •

16~ew York ~im.~t April 7, 1946, p. 9, IV

I
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period in these few words:
The postwar anti-labor movement had its foundation in
the widespread and large-scale strikes ot 1945-46 and
the wage drives of 1946-47 which irritated a public-far too busy converting itself to peacetime living to
bother with the relevancy of issues raised. by union.which assumed, as the press oonstantly reiterated, Ithat
most of its economic problems were caused by labor. 7 .
The first round ot strikes began later in the tall of 1945.
In the beginning ot 1946, the industrial relations picture
became dismal.

The Tribune assessed the situation in terms ot

the number on strike in the following ed1torial,
At last report 400,000 industrial workers were on
strike in this country. Strikes intended to paralyze
the steel industry with its ?OO,OOO employees, the
manufacture of el.~trical equipment with 200,000
employees are scheduled for the middle of the present
month. A telephone strike, involving a quarter of a
million men and women, is also threatened and another
in the farm machiner,y plants. The General MOisrs
strike is already .well into its second month.
When the United Auto Workers led the first round of
strikes, the public was somewhat taken aback b1 the intensity
with which the union was going about achieving ita goal; however. the reaction was comparatively minor in view of the
distress caused by later disputes.

The

~1.es

expressed its

opinion in the form of a recommendation to observe the President's wage policy.

This question is an example of the initial

reaction of the public to the strikes and wage demands:
•

17Joseph Rayback. A HistOiji of American Labor (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1959'. p. 3 •
18Chicaso fribupe. Januar.y 8, 1946. p~ 8.
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Is it evidence ot a desire to destroy unions when
management ofters wage increases within the limits of
a national policy announced by the President. but
refuses wage iucreases which will mean higher prices
to eonsumers?l~
The

~ribune

was

s~pathetic

to at least one union during

the beginning ot this action tilled year.

It even praised the

union leadership in a tongue in cheek manner:
The Tribune has had frequent occasion to criticize
shortsighted union leadership ••• It may be that this
criticism is baving constructive results. Whatever
considerations intervened in the settlement at the
(stock) yards, we feel that the union_officials have
acted wisely. We congratulate them. 20
At the beginning ot that year several major strikes were
pendinsmaking the public somewhat skeptical as to what it
should expect of the unions in the United States.

Such ambiva-

lence is still apparent in this early editorial on the steel
strike:
A strike of 700,000 is threatening tor January 14, if
a OIO demand for $2. a day wage increase is denied.
President Truman has called upon the union to show
patience until a fact-finding board can determine
whether an increase in the price of steel can be granted
the producers ••• We do not believe that they, the union,
will interfere with the greater achievement in production, in efficiency, or technology, tor by doing so,
21
they would injure those whose interests they represent.
The editorial explained why it was opposed to fact-finding
boards by pointing out that they are "projecting into steel and

19New York Times, January 20, 1946,

p. 8,

IV.

20 New York Times, January 27, 1946, p. 8, IV.

21Chic~o Tribune, January 6, 1946, p. 20.
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automobile controversies a very definite spearhead of socialism;
given time, they may go most of the way toward a virtual socialization of American industry.22
The fact-finding committee appointed by the President to
investigate the steel dispute recommended a 19.5 cents an hour
wage increase, the same amount as recommended in the Auto
Workers strike.

U~

S. Steel rejected the proposed amount, and

the union struck as planned.

The strike affected 750,000

workers and 85 per cent ot the indUstry.

The final settlement

was reached one month later with the union getting an 18.5 cent
wage increase .23
As the number of strikes grew in scale, making them hard to
ignore, the public grew less ambivalent and wore negative in its
reaction to the strikes.

The strikes that directly affec.ted the

public, of course, produced even more hostile reactions.

~e

coal strike, for instance, aroused the public to voice its opinion on both the strike and Mr. Lewis, the President Gt the coal
miners' union.

One editorial in the TribUDt stated that, "this

ought to be the last nation-wide coal strike and it will be if
Congress does its dutYt p24 implying that the government should
take some action to restrain Lewis.

An especially sardonic

220hicago Tribune, January 6, 1946. p. 20.

23Taft • p. 572.
24Ch1cago Tr1bune, May 8. 1946. p. 18.

letter aimed at Lewis had this to say:
Now that • Eyebrows , Lewis has grudgingly permitted us
to enjoy the contort of heated homes until next March.
I think it about time that industry and private home
owners see the light and switch from coal to oil or
gas as soon as possible to do so. As the demand for
coal diminishes, so will the power and ego ot Lewis. 25
Most letters about Mr. Lewis fell into this oategory; bowever.
one letter was published by the

~ibun!

glowing in praise for

Mr. Lewis:
Lewis has always proved himselt the most able leader
this country has ever seen. That·s why he is hated
by the New Deal. That's wby the admin1stra~6on in
Washington is trying to hold the strike on.
The Itw YOlk fia,s showed more concern over the nation-wide
atter effects of the coal strike in the following editorial:

It the 18~ cent an hour pattern is increased in an
effort to buy otf the coal strike, other labor unions
will insist upon obtaining additional raise~7and these.
too, have to be reflected in higher prices.
As much criticism was directed at Mr. Lewis as at the
actual strike.

The Tribunt found much to criticize in

Mr. Lewis' attitude.

In an editorial headlined "Strike or

Insurrection?". the Tribune found Mr. Lewis' interpretation of
the meaning of collective bargaining totally Objectionable. 28
250hic !sO !rlbune, December 11. 1946, p. 22.

26qh~C!S2 TriiYn!, May 8, 1946, p. 18.
27qhiC !60 Tribun". May 22. 1946. p. 20.
28Chicaso Tribune, May 8, 1946. p. 18.
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In another editorial the Tribune seems to have been thoroughly
disgusted with Lewis' tactics.

It warned in a threa'tening tone,

"Mr. Lewis will be well advised not to challenge the nation in
its present mood.

He can't win such a contest.

He can land

beh1nd~bar8 ... 29

Before an agreement eould be reached. Lewis became involved
in a new dispute concerning vacation payments.

The resulting

series ot disagreements with the government caused Lewis to
inform the miners that an impasse was reached; the governa.a'
considered this, in effect, a strike call.

Lewis was sub.e-

quently held in contempt ot court and fined $10,000 personally,
with the union being fined '3.5 million.

An appeal to the U. I.

Supreme Court brought a diminished tine of 1700,000 tor the
union, but the same tine tor Lewis.

He was torced to call ott

the strike and pay the tine upon threat of being forced to pay
the initial fin •• 30
The railroad strike, which occurred at the same time aa the
coal strike, was also severely #.njurlous to organized labor's
public lmage.

TheTE1gune round this occasion to be appropriate

for chastising both unions.

!9Chlcaso Tribune, November 18, 1946, p. 18.

30Tatt , p. 575.

The government has taken over the operation of the coal
mines and the railroads in an ettort to prevent the
paralysis of the economic lite.
These unions are monopolies. All of the members of
each of the monopolies are capable ot acting, and do
aot, in unison to achieve their Ob. jectives by bringing
suffering to all of the people. 3l
The

Tr1bun~

found concurrence among its readers; this letter was

published at a later dates

uWh7 not apply some of the methods

used in restricting the great capitalistic combines of the past
to controlling the great, and almost; unrestrained labor monopolies of the present?"32

~he New York Time! placed the blame

on lenient legislation, reinforcing the growing dissatisfaction
with the Wagner Act.

The following editorial excerpt observed,

uno essential industry is tree today trom the threat of being
completely shut down unless it complies with a series of
demands ... 33
The extent of public disapproval ot the railroad strike can
be discerned from the reaction of some merchants in Florida who
refused to sell tood to railroad workers on strike.;4 A l.'ter
from one ot the strikers, published by the Tribuu!. exposed the
other side ot the coin:
3l0hicago Tribune, Kay 23, 1946. p. 18.
32Chlcaso Tribune, December 11, 1946, p. 22.
33N!O! Jori Times, May 13. 1946, p. 20.

34 New York

tAles,

May

26, 1946, p. 24.
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Every railroad man knows that the retirement provisions
as set forth in the railroad retirement act, are wholly
inadequate ••• the railroad worker cannot retire until he
reaches the age of 651 and th,en he will not because he
just cantt see where ,120 a month will give him and his
wife the living they art certainly entitled to after 45
years of hard service.~'
Most major labor disputes were settled according to government proposed wage increases.

The publio, it seems, was will'ing

to forgive and forget as long as industrial peace was to

preval~

In retrospect we find that the short period ot calm in the
summer of 1946 was really the eye ot the storm.

The spirit of

industrial peace was to last until the winter ot 1946, when
Walter Reuther (whO was to be elected to the presidency of the
United Automobile Worders Union during this strike) proudly
announced that the UAW would lead the nation in a second round
of strikes.

This prospect thoroughly enraged the public.

Reuther based his wage demands on the report of a tormer government economist, which stated that, ·on the basis ot estimated
earnings tor 1947, business can support a 25 per cent increase
in wages. n36 When the government suggested that Reuther modify
some ot his demands, he accused the government of siding with
management.

The lew Ygrk T1m!s did not agree with this conten-

tion and instead tound the fault lying with organized labor.
35Chicaso Tribune"

May 6, 1946, p. 14.

}GNew York Times. December l~, 1946. p. 22.
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"This explanation overlooks entirely the pressure tor price
increases created by the large wage increases demanded and
obtained by the CIO unions themselves last spring."3?
The second wave
Organized labor disregarded the menacing signs at public
disapproval and plunged into preparations tor a second campaign

at strikes,

The

~ribun.

warned the coal miners that a strike

would bring calamity.
It the coal union forces a further increase in wages
in the negotiations soon to start, it will inevitably
bring higher prices tor coal and otter further inducements to coal &co.nomY the use of substituting tuels,
bankruptcy tor coal ml nes, and unemployment for coal
miners.;S

In another editorial the Tribune pointed out the gravity

ot a nation-wide strike, adding another warning:
A strike in a single mine or group of mines can be
troublesome and costly to the country, but cannot
paralyze it. A simUltaneous strike in all the coal
tields is insurrection and as such, must be forbidden
under heavy penalty.'9
Public opinion, as expressed in a letter to the Tribune, objects
~o

all strikes and strikers, showing the lack ot patience ot the

public with the situation.
3?New York Times, October 22, 1946, p. 24.
>BOhicaso Tribune, January 19, 194?, p. 20.

390h~ca60 Tribune, March 8, 1947, p. 10.
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29
When a union, a group that hasn't a nickel invested in
a business, sets up itself as the dictators as to who
shall work or who shall not work in that businesst it
40
is p~re usurpation and it becomes a group of racketeers.
When the inopportune proposal was made to pay the mine
workers for time lost during their last strike, the public was
indignant, as this letter to the Tribune will demonstrate:
The proposal of Robert L. Gordon, state director of
labor, to pay 3~ million dollars to Il11nois coal miners
for the time they spent in idleness during John L. Lewis'
'no contract no work' 84rike a year ago is wrong legally
and scandalous morally.
The disregard by Lewis of the court ruling forbidding a
strike caused much antagonism toward the mine workers specifically and unions in general.

"Mr. Lewis has succeeded in

getting most of his miners out of the mines despite a Supreme
Court ruling forbidding him to do 80.,,42 Lewis was subsequently
heavily fined for contempt ot court, again providing a great
deal of negative publicity at an especially inopportune time.
Few strike.s escaped the censure of the press during this
periOd.

The railroad workers· strike received this comment trom

the press.
The additional billion dollars sought by the railroad
unions would not move an extra pound of trate (sic) anywhere in the country. It would be a tax on all frate (sic)
users for the benefit of a relatively small group ot railroad workers, many ot whom would be paid tor not working. 4 3
4OChicago Tribune. April 23. 1947,p.1B.
410hioaso Tribune, May 15, 1947, p. 24.
42New York Times, April 9, 1947. p. 24.
43Chicaso Tribun!. July 8, 1947. p. 12.

However, the Tribune also published the miners' side of the
story in a letter from one of the strikers explaining his motivation tor striking.

RRather than wage increases, most of us

would rather see price control work.

But as that is a failure,

all we want now is a salary that will keep up with rising
pricesl""
The UAW strike incurred the wrath ot the Tribun! to the
extent that an editorial leveled the most serious insult that
the Tribune had in store--communist aftiliat1on. 45 Later in the

year when the UAW struck Ford, the Tribune again published
editorials with obvious contempt for the motives of the strikers
and their leaders.
The labor war lords are not now challenging the constitutionality ot the act; they are asserting their
defiance ot it and tor the people's representatives
in Oongress who enacted_it. (The law referred to is
~he Taft-Hartley Act.)46
Public opinion as voiced by one individual's letter to the
Tribunt offered some drastic; -solutions to the UAW activities:
Michigan has been disgraced by city officials who say,
'we are umpires, not strike breakers.' Umpires are
needed in games, but they are not needed in oases of
burglary or strike violence •. It would take but a
small amount ot effective shooting to bring to an end
the criminally conducted strikes ~hat htxe afflicted
our state and nation tor so many years. 'l
Cai2 Tribune, April 25~ 194?,p. 12.
440h&
4 5Ch!2a {:50 Tribune, February 16, 1947, p. 20.
46Chlcaso

Tr~bun!,

August ?, 1947, p. 16.

470h!CasO Tribune, October 1, 1947, p. 6.
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The New York Times had relatively favorable comments to
make about the settlement of the steel strike in the midst ot
activity concerning the passage ot the Taft-Hartley Bill.
Undoubtedly there are some things to be said in favor
of this agreement. For one thing, it obviously is not
as serious a threat to inflation as the original
demands would have been, had they been met. For another
thing. it has been unaccompanied by two of the ~orst
evils associated with the general round ot wage demands
a year ago. One of these widespread stoppages was in
the oountryts basic industries, the other was the i11starred intervention of Government through its so-oalled
Fact-linding boards. «hich purported to say how much
these industries could afford to pay in the way ot
higher wages. 48
The telephone workers strike caused a great deal ot comment
in the Obi0ti0 Tribgne.

One editorial censured the government

for not stopping tbe strikE"
Oongress. which used to jump over the stiok every time

Mr. Roosevelt cried emergenoy. now bas a real emergency

on its hands and is proceedlng with its routlne business.
Since nothing can be expected of the executive, 60ngress
should drop its oi;her b}i.ainess and enact a utility antistrike law immediately. 'j

Another editorial expressed a great deal of vehemence and advocated government intervention.

"The nation's telephone communi-

cation system has been paralyzed by what is oalled a strike. It
should be called a conspiracy against the Amerioan people. nSO
Letters to the editor varied in tone.

For instance, this letter

48Chioaso Tribunl, April 23. 1947, p. 24.
49Chioaso Tribun!, April l'l, 1947, p. 20.

5OCh;oaso Tribune, April 8, 1947, p. 14.

to the Tribune seemed to ask a sincere question:

"How long is a

long-suffering public supposed to wait for this outrageous strike
against us to end?N5l

The following letters cited here came

from people directly involved in the strike.

One employee ot

the telephone company expressed what was probably a

co~~on

sentiment:
Can you see the humiliation ot crawling back to work
now? I have wished tor a long time that we oould all
return to work honorably and respeotably, together.52
Another letter is trom the wite ot a striker, clearly opposed to
the strike:
I think a lot ot them are using very poor judgement in ,
allowing themselves to be coerced into strikes by stew
hotheads, or would-be 'big-shots.' I only hope that these
ill-advised employees will not Spoil things tor the rest
of us who have no kiok ooming. 5 '
Ironically, a union at the TribuPI struok on November 26,

1947, and continued to strike throughout the tollowing year.
The TribuD!. however. did not ohange its editorial policy toward
labor as a result.

The newspaper did not comment on the situa-

tion, except to apologize tor its poorly printed format.

It

did, however, print many letters trom its subscribers commending
it tor continuing to operate in spite of the strike.
The appeals ot unions 1n the torm ot wage demands and
threatened strikes during 1946 found a public that was

51Chica~o Tribun~, April 25, 1947, p. 12.
52Chica~o Tribune, April 25, 1947, p. 12.

5'Obica~o Tribune, April 27, 1947, p. 22.

unreceptive to such impositions.

People were not well disposed

to the prospect of suffering further inconveniences imposed by
unions.

Public sentiment, as expressed by the following letters

to the editor of the Tribune, was highly antagonistic toward
labor.
Let any man strike who will. Merely let other men, if
they so desire, to apply tor and take the jobs of the
strikers ••• Let the law of supply and demand freely operate in~work and you will see men paid what they are
worth.~

Another reader had this opinion of his fellow working men:
Why should thousands of people, who work the year
aroun~pay their taxes, and receive small incomes, be
kicked in the teeth twice--once thru (sic) taxes to
maintain relief role for strikers and second, thry
(sic) high prices because of the strikers' greed?"
fhe right to strike was severely challenged by the public.
Tribune reader asked the following question:
Wherein lies the right to strike when it is collusion
or grouping together of many individuals in organized
bodies to restrain trade, destroy private property,
and interfere with that basic right of the ~reedom ot
man to wo~k when and where he chooses and at his own
contract?56
The New York Times stated that, "nearly all strikes are
strikes against the public."

It further suggested a remedy:

54Chicaso TribuD!, June 6, 1946, p. 18.
55wew York Times, June 2, 1946, p. 20.
56Chicago Tribune. May 21, 1946, p. 10.
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It 1s surely time that we removed the positive
encouragement to strike in existing Federal legislation, (the Wagner Act) and in a lax local enforcement
which permits strikers to prevent even former workers
who wish to do 80, from peaceably continuing at their
jobs.57
In another editorial the Time; remarked on

the~ne-sided"

legislation benefitting labor, suggesting that restrictions be
put on union activities. 58 Professor Sumner Slichter seemed to
be a voice in the wilderness in his admonitions.

He said:

"any attempt to forbid strikes or to impose compulsory arbitration would

~nly

make the ultimate situation incomparably worse

than the present one.»59

Most editorial excerpts seem to

follow the line of thought that unions have been exercising too
many rights and exhibiting too much power.

Much of the negative

feeling seems to be directed against the Wagner Act, which was
at this time felt to be too lenient.

Suggestions to repeal this

law or pass new limiting leb!alation were few at first, but
gained much strength among the various antagonistic groups with
the menace of prolonged strikes.
After a fairly quiet fall, December brought the year, 1946,
to a climactic ending.

The Secretary of Labor, Mr. Schwellen-

bach, reported that "profits far more than increased wages are
responsible for the present high cost ot living. w60

57New

York Times, May 10, 1946, p. 18.

58w,w York

Times, Pebruary 10, 1946. p. 22.

59New York Times, January 16, 1946, p. 22.
60New York Times, December 4, 1947, p. 4.

~5

This report aroused organized labor.
010 demanded a third round of strikes.

The vice-president of the
The third series of

industrial disputes never materialized, however.

Actually, the

first two waves of strikes and wage demands had sufficiently
incited the public and its representatives to take legal
measures against the organized labor movement.

OBA..PTER IV

LEGISLATIVE REACTION
The Smith-Oonnally Act
One of the first pieces of negative labor legislation
which had an ominous fore bearing for organized labor occurred
immediately prior to the period under examination.

The Bmith-

Connally Act passed in 194' was a measure meant to restrict
strikes during the period ot hostilities.
The strikes that presented a problem during the wartime
period plus the agitation of anti-union employers encouraged the
passage of the Smith-Connally Bill.

Dulles describes the

measure in these words.
The b111 provided. in the first instance, statutory
authority for the War Labor Board. In the event that
the board's intervention in a labor dispute proved
unsuccessful. the President was then empowered to take
overcontrol of any plant or industry where a halt in production threatened the war effort. with criminal penalties for any persons who thereafter instigated or
promoted a strike.~
John L. Lewis, Jresident of the coal miners. immediately
made use of that part ot the provision requiring that a strike
lDulles, p.

,8.
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be announced thirty days bafore it commences.
Times to make the following observation:

h~his

This prompted the
is the result ot

one of the stupidest pieces of legislation, for the SmithConnally Act will doubtless point to his (Lewis') denunciation
as an excuse for preserving this absurd provision. M2 In
another espeOially caustic editorial, entitled:
Ooal

~ields,"

"Alice in the

the times circuitously praised the coal miners:

At least Alice had the sense to rebel. "I can't stand
this any longer, ... she cried atter her adventures
through the looking glass. Hundred of thousands of
Americans have been showing intelligence and courage
on the field ot battle. Why hasn't there been enough
intelligence and enough moral courage among our representatives in Oongress tor them to speak oyt against
this fantastic provision and to repeal it?'
The Tribune called the Smi th-Oonnal1y Act- I. a law to promote
strikes."

The editorial did note, however, that this was the
unforseen result ot a well-intended proposal. 4
Even at this early date, the summer ot 1945, both the
Tribune and the Times were hinting at amending the Wagner Act or
introducing other legislation to compensate for what was felt to
be undue leniency toward labor.

The tone ot the editorial

opinion can be felt in this excerpt trom the Timeit describing
,.

proposed legislation which is unfriendly toward labor:
2New YO£k Tim!s, Octobe» 12, 1945. p. 22.

3New York Times, March 30, 1945, p. 14.
4-Chicaso Tribulle. December 2, 1945, p. 20.

n •••

Senators Hatch, Ball, and Burton brought forth a proposed

labor policy for the Government. which has been extemporizing in
this field for many years. u5
The post-war wage demands made by major unions and the
clamorous strikes to gain their objectives lett the public
embittered against the powerful unions.

New wage claims served

to portray the unions as greedy and too willing to take advantage of their war torn employers.
The Portal-to-Portal Act
The Portal-to-Portal Act was passed at the height of a
period when the cr.y tor anti-union legislation was being heard
more often than not.

The expressed purpose of the law was to

protect employers from law suits claiming unreasonable amounts
in back wages.

In some cases the demands were unreasonable to

the extent that the employer would have been wiped out financially had he paid the claims of the unions.

The Mt. Olemen!

Potter: case was the impetus tor the quick passage of an
obviously necessary law defining working time and compensable
time.

The ease in point was the Anders2n, It. ale v. Nt, Olem-

ens Potterz Compagz.6 The United Pottery Workers of America
charged the Company with violation of the Fair Labor Standards
'New York Ti!e!. June 21. 1945, p. 18.
6Anderson

v,

Mt, Clemens Potter: ComiaQZ. 328 U.S. 680

(194?).
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Act regarding remuneration for time the employees considered
part of their working time.

The problem arose because most ot

the employees were being paid on a piece rate basis. which
meant that the time they spent actually getting to the place ot
work after dressing on the premises was not compensable time.
The decision of the court regarding the employees' claims
was only resolved after a series of appeals.

The original

decision of the district court was in the employees' favor.
However, this 4eci8ion was over-ruled by the Cirouit Court.
which found the time delay incompensable.

An appeal to the

U. S. Supreme Court led to another reversal but stipulated that
the amount of remuneration would depend on the findings of a
survey under the auspices of the Cirouit Court.

The final

decision held that the time spent 1n getting to the job after
dressing was not significant enough to be retroactively
remunerated.
ed by the

This decision 1n lavor of the company was apprais-

T~mel

in the following manner:

Judge PiCard's decision in the Mount Clemens Pottery
Company case had not killed off all pending portalto-portal suits, nor has it diminished the need for
Federal legislation to keep such demands from reaching
fantastic limits. But the effect bas been wholesome.?

A Tribune editorial pointed out specifically what was commendable in its opinion about Judge Picard·s decision:
••• lay down two generalizations which commended themselves for their intelligence and reasonableness. These

7New York Times, February 14, 1947. p. 20.

were (1) that any .eretorious suit should not be
retroactive beyond June 10, 1946, when the Supreme
Court handed down its intervretations of 'working
time' as that time used in productive activities·
and (2) that the doctrine of working time should not
apply in the case of manufacturing as it does in such
hazardous induetries such as mining, unless it is
t substantial.' 8
This confusion over working time and compensable time led
to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act on May 14, 1947.

The

stated purpose of the law as stated by Oongress tollow.:

An Act to relieve employers trom certain liabilities

and punishments under the Fair Labor Standards Act ot

1956, as amended, the Walsh-Healy Act, and the BaconDavis Act, and tor other purposes. 9

Public opinion was strongly against labor's position on
Portal pay.

One editorial in the New

~ork

Time! pointed out

that with every new labor suit, labor is hurting its own public
image and endangering its already unstable position with
Congress:
Actually union labor lo.essomething with every new
suit that 1s announced, in terms of the balance of
strength between those members of Congress who tavor
punitive labor legislation and those who counsel
moderation. It would be difficult to conceive of
anything better conceived to play into the hands of
the reactlon&r7 element than this newest demonstra10
tion of short-sightedoess on the part of union ,leaders.
Another editorial in the New York Timel summed up the
public distaste tor breaking the rules of fair play.

aNeW York Times, April 4, 1947, p. 22.
9tabor Law Course, (New York:

1964)t p. "~13 •.

Commerce Clearing House.

lONew York Times, January 4, 1947, p. 14.
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But to introduce changes in the 'rules of the game'
retroactively is an entirely different matter. Few
persons will find it difficult to decide, as between
the attitude of those unions which have started suits
to obtain 'back pay- which they never contefplated
receiving when they signed their contracts. ~
~he

issue of collective bargaining was brought up by the

Times to remind organized labor af its own preferred method of
solving labor-manege.ent relations problems.
In the end we hope that organized labor will realize
that wages ought to be ~djusted by collective bargaining, not by fantastic proceedings at law, and that
this famouf2issue will be remembered only as an historic
curiosity.

The

~ribune

published a few letters from the public

expressing, strongly negative opinions on the matter.

One such

letter sardonically suggested paying soldiers portal-to-portal
pay.l'

Another letter in the same vein had this to say:

I suggest that union labor bosses demand pay from their
employers tor time spent in their favorite barber shop,
the time also to include portal-to-portal pay •••• Atter
all, didn't their hair and whisker!4do a large part of
their growing on company property?
One letter suggested an accounting system; the author agreed to
portal-to-portal pay tor both s1des, but only under h1s aooounting system.

T1me under th1s system would be aocounted for and

paid accordingly.

Por instanoe, time used for personal matters

llN!W York Time Sit January 18 t 1947, p. 14.

12New YO£k T1m'!.s, February 9. 1947, p. 8, IV.
13Ch1caso

Tr1bun~,

January

,.

1947, p. 12.

14Chic8fiO Tribune, February 8. 1947. p. 8.

would be deducted from company time. 15

There was, of course,.

another side to this story, as made apparent by this letter to
the Tr1bunt:
I remember, when I worked in a large steel plant, my
fellow workers and I were docked 15 minutes for any
time over three minutes that we punched in late. I
guess itlgll depends on who is wearing the shoe that
pinches.

The Case Bill

As the second wave of strikes was distressing the public
and portal-to-portal claims were making labor unions look
greedy. the 80th Congress was actively planning more retaliatory
measures.

This sample of editorial advice on legislation

governing industrial affairs comes from the Tribune:
The continuous interference with national life and the
persecuting of everybody by a very few labor leaders
in key positions bas become by tar the greatest domestic problem ot today. Congress cannot move tO~-fast
to tree the American people from this tyranny. (

A week later, the Tribune reported with

increase~ re~vor:

The public is getting heartily sick and tired of picket
lines. Pickets should be rigorously restricted to the
peaceful exercise of that function. Oongress is amending labor statutes that should strike out the one-sided
provisions ot existing laws which prevent the discipline
and regulation of picketing, to see that i* remains

lawtu1;~8

15

Ohicago ~£ibune,
16Chicaso Tribune"
17Chicaso Tribune,
18Chicaso Tribune,

February 6, 1947, p. 18.
February 18, 1947. p. 18.
May 2, 1947, p. 16.
May 20, 1947, p. 18.
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The New York Times was more specific in outlining its objections
to existing legislation.

First, the Times said, " ••• we con-

cluded that the 'Wagner Act', in its present form. has tended to
increase and prolong strikes ••• "

This was followed by a nega-

tive appraisal of the National Labor Relations Board, which the
Timel said, " ••• makes it an easy and riskless undertaking to
and prolong strikes, whatever the cause of the strike or
the conduct of the strikers. ul9
star~

The Oase Bill, submitted to President Truman May 29, 1946.
was devised expressly to limit strikes.

Foster Rhea Dulles

described it as follows:
Among other features it set up a Federal Mediation
Board, prescribed a sixty-day cooling off period before
any strike could be called, decreed 108S:ot their rights
under the Wagner Act tor any workers who in these circumstances lett their jobs, banned both secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, and authorized the
use of injunctions to prevent violent or obstructionsl
picketing. 20
.

A Tribune editorial expressed the hope that the Oase Bill
would be a test to determine the need tor stronger measures;
The passage of the (Oase) Bill would serve, at least.
as a warning to union leaders that they don't own the
country. If that warning isntt enough, Oongress will
have to go farther and flatly forbid strikes in public
utili~ies and atew other essential industries, like
coal. I

19New York Times, February 15, 1947, p. 14.
2ODulles, p. 372.
21Chieago Tribune, May 4, 1946, p. 10.
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Another editorial in the Tribune praised a portion ot the bill
which the Tribune felt was a sorely needed remedy for an unequivocal situation.

That section, according to this editorial,

made, " ••• labor unions and employers equally liable under law
for violations of their contracts. n22 The *imes. however, was
not

80

favorably disposed to the Case ,8ill.

It especially

objected to the idea of government seizure beoause:
to erode the idea of private property."23
passed because of the President's veto.

"It tends

The Case Bill was not

Oongress, however, did

not intend to allow the matter of curbing union power to end
there.

Although the President was opposed to severe legislative

measures, he did concur with Congress on some points:
President Harry Truman recognized the existing sentiment for change. and in his State of the Union message
to Congress, on January 6, 1947 suggested action be
taken to prohibit Jurisdictiona1 strikes and oertain
kinds of secondary boycotts. He also asked for the
creation ot more efficient machinery for the avoidanoe
of strikes and lockouts. Finally. he recommended the
appointment of a temporary joint commission to inquire
into the entire field ot labor-management relations
and r9Port back to Congress not later than March 15.
1947. 2 11Both the Bouse and the Senate moved quickly to formulize their
objections to union aotivities and construct some sort of
format tor revising the current labor laws.
22ChicagO Tr1buD!. February 3. 1946, p. 20.

23 New York Times, May 23. 1946. p_ 20.
24Taft , p. 579.
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The Ta.ft-Hartley Act
In April of 1947 the first drafts of a new labor law were
being discussed in the press.
Tribune editorials

~overing

An excerpt from one of the first

the proposed legislation follows:

Both the House and Senate have labor reform bills in
committee. Both bills have excellent features and
both have features of debateable merit. Both will be
taught bitterly by organized labor on all pOints, good
and bad, but it caD be expected, and certainly it is
to be hoped, that '.:;Congress will not bl swayed by the
protests of these special interests. 2 ,
Reactions to the first drafts were very soon being hotly discussed in the press.

The New York Times had the following

reaction to Philip t1urray' s charges against the proposed legislation:
••• there is nothing to justify the extravagant charge
of Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, that the pending proposals
represent the first step toward Fascism in the United
States ••• As debate begins, the clear need is for
legislation which is not anti-labor but anti-labor
monopoly. 26
One vociferous spokesman for the labor faction, Willi.am Green,
led a vigorous campaign against the Taft-Hartley in the New York
press.

The

Ti.e~

reported the statements made by Mr. Green, but

summed up the comments in praise of the bill.
25ChiC8S0 Tribune, April 12, 1947, p. 12.

26ft !W York Times, April 15, 1947. p. 24.

In a nation-wide broadcast the other evening, William
Green, President of the American Federation of Labor,
repeatedly referred to the two labor bills which have
been taken in charge by Senate-House conference commit27
tees as the Taft-Hartley slave-labor legislation ••••••
In the early stages of the 'l'a!t-Hartley Bill, the Times editorials were strongl7 opposed to the objections made by organized
labor, as indicated by the following excerpt:

"The Hartley Bill

was never as bad as Mr. Green would have us believe, but it is
a much better measure for the changes that have been written
into it in conference committee ••• Q28 Mr. Green, in turn,
became increasingly

a~rimonious

in his replies, as in this

letterr
Apparently, that 1s the difference between you and me.
Your expressed opinion and attitude toward the Hartley
and Taft anti-labor bills apparently are based on your
academic logio and conclusions, influenced perhaps by
a biased attitude toward the labor unions. My opinion
is based upon realism, facts and lessens learned in
the hard school of experience. 2 9
The Time! recognized the resistance of organized labor to the
proposed legislation and suggested the use ot accepted methods
in laborts fight.

The following is evidence of this:

Labor is still determined to tight the measure and, if
possible. force its repeal. Present prospects, however,
are that the long battle will be wageG. only in the t.ra- 30
dit10nal American way, through courts and the ballot box •.

27New York Times, September 1, 1947, p. 18.
28New York Time!. May 28. 1947, p. 24.
29New York T1e!s, May 28, 1947, p. 24.
30New York Tae!, June 29, 1947, p. 10, IV.

Another editorial confirmed the tormer observation regarding
planned political action.
American labor has embarked upon a new political program and that its program in etfect it not in purpose,
constitutes an attempt to torm a pol itical bloc. The
occasion is the o~po8ition of most labor leaders to the
!raft-Hartley Act.~~
The Times made another observation when it perceived the difterence 1n attitude between the 010 and AFL regarding a course
ol action in opposing the Taft-Hartley Bill.

The Times

predicted this ditterence in attitudes would result in further
dissension between the two groups.
Organized labor's opposition to the Taft-Bartley Law
appeared to be taking such different practical forms
that the new legal repressions may intensity the
struggle between the two ma~or union groups instead
ot driving themx~loser together as many observers
had prophesied.""
President Truman hesitated between advising Oongress to pass the
necessary measures and warning Coogress against punitive
legislation.

His tone in a message to Congress exhibited this

feeling of restraint in advising limiting union power.
But all )his is one thing.

It is quite another thing

and a very necessary thing. to overhaul existing led-

eral labor legialation--beginning with the Wagner Act-in order to weaken the power of artificially created
monopolies and create the conditions whiCh will foster
more even-handed collective bargaining.~'

31N9!w York !rimes, December 26, 1947, pl. 14.
32 New York !rim,s. June 28, 1947 t pl. 12.
33N!W York lim!s. January 7. 1947, p. 26.
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The Times did not view the forthcoming bill as punitive, but as
necessary in this excerpt:
There has been little or no suggestion of anything,
that could be described as •punitive , legislation •••
in what that group seeks is not legislation which
would outlaw strikes, but legislation which would
make them unnecessary.~
One indication of public opinion was a letter published by the
Times asking tor fair play.
What we call 'labor' is made up of citizens of the
United States. What is •punitive , about arranging
our laws so that every citizen is subject to exactly

:::r~::: ~.;;s ~~!,~e~!;t3~::?o~~::~t~::rt~!ay?35
The following letter, strongly opposed to the proposed
legislatioD. was somewhat unusual because of its authors---the
letter was signed by twenty eminent protessors ot the top
universities in the United States.

This excerpt desoribes the

area ot their concern:

w. strongly oppose any legislation which attempts to
wipe out the gains made in the last decade granting
the workers a somewhat more equal bargaining position
with industry, and which proposes how to plact workers
economically at the mercy of their employers.,6
The New York Tim,s seemed somewhat inconsistent in its
attitude toward the Taft-Hartley. Bill.

On one occasion it

favored the Senate bill, but not the House bill. as expressed
by the following quotation:

"Bey York

Times, February 19, 1947, p. 24.
"5New York fimes, February 7. 1947, p. 22.
36fte ! York Timeg, March 12, 1947, p. 24.
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Mr. Hartley, o~ New Jersey, ventured the prediction
that the tinal draft ot this important legislation
will drop both the proposed prohibition ot industrywide bargaining and the proposed authorization tor
private employers to seek injunctions against certain
types of strikes ••• we hope that Mr. Hartley's torecast
ia correct.
We trust that the House conferees and behind them
the House itselt, will have the statesmanship to waive
provincial pride and take the Senate bill ~ith a tew
minor improvements, and take it promptly.3~

In another editorial, however, the Timel expressed opposition to
the bills ot both Houses tor the following reasons:
These bills be~ore Congress, however, both the drastic
Hartley Bill and the less extreme Taft Bill, would, to
an extent not generally reoQ,nized, increase Governmen~
intervention, encourage resort to the National Labor
Relations Board or the court, and prevent prompt settlement at home o~ many questions tor Which there is not
real need for lederal intervention.'S
The House of Representatives pas.sed their bill by a
"decisive majority ot 308-102."39. The Senate passed a less
severe bill which the New York Times found to be an impressive
p ,

indication of majority approval.
But the size of the majority it was able to command,

68 to 24, conveys a message which is too plain to be

misread. In our opinion it is an effort which, in
its general approach to the problem. reflects the
democratic process at its best. 40

Since the bills pasaed by the two Houses were significantly
different, the President appointed a committee to combine the
prOVisions into a single bill.

37New York Tim,s, May 16, 1947, p. 22.
,aNew York Times. May 6, 1947, p. 26.
,gNeW York T~mes. May 7, 1947, p. 26.
40New York Times, May 14, 1947, p. 24.

~bile

the two

Hous~s

ot government were busy reaching a

compromise, the press was pessimistic.

A Tim!s editorial

observed that, • ••• much is heard of the possibility that these
efforts will come to naught.

That possibility stems trom the

tact that no one 1s quite sure what kind of legislation the
President will approve and what kind would invoke his veto_· 41
Speculations were common that the President intended to veto the
bill for

po~itical

reasons.

The Times has this observation to

mue:
Labor's prestige in legislation halls has fallen to a
new low, yet its potential political influence has
never been greater than today ••• lt the political solidarity ot organized labor is cemented in the coming
months, some observers believe that the political swing
ot last year will be reversed. 42
This prediction made at the height ot the anti-union public
sentiment turned out to be a correct one.

President Truman's

political motives in vetoing the Taft-Hartley were not quite so
tavorably viewed by the press.

The New York Times had this to

say:
Most political observers agree that while Mr. Truman
may not win in 1948 with the labor vote, he certainly
cannot win without it.43
The Times also made note of the tact that the President and
many Senators were receiving a great deal ot mail in support ot
41 New York Times, May 7, 1947, p. 26.
42New York Tim.es, May 4, 1947, p. 7, IV.
I

43New York Times, April 20, 1947, p.

7, IV.
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the President's intention to veto the proposed legislation.

The

Times did not seem to have any faith in opinions expressed
through the mails.
Floods of telegrams are sa.id to have descended on many
anti-veto Senators, urging them to switch to the support
of the President. The effort was nil ••• The reason for
this is, of course, familiar. Floods and inundations of
telegrams may be released on Congressmen by somebody
pressing a button. 44
Another editorial suggested ignoring the mail and examining the
election record of the House of Representatives during the last
election.

Mr. Truman's mail, we are told, is running strongly in
favor of a veto ot the new labor bill which now awaits
his action ••• Is it not fair to assume that the members
of a House of Representatives elected on peacetime
issues only have at least as good an understanding of
what their constituents expect of them---if there is
unfortunately to be a difference of judgement here--as has a President elected under the wartime conditions
of 194414 5
.
The Bill, as submitted by the conference, was passed in the
Sena.te by a vote ot 54 to 17, and in the House by a vote of 320
to 79.46 The Time, had this to say on the results of the vote:
nIt

d~sarmed

the more extreme and unreasoning of its critics

(who, needless to say, are also the noisiest) of the weapon
whioh up to this point has been their reliance. n47
44New York
, Times, June 26, 1947. p. 22.
45New York Time! I June 11, 1947, p. 26.
46

Taft, p. 583.
4?New York Tim!!, June 5, 1947, p.

2~.
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The President was, nevertheless, not satisfied with the
bill and proceeded to veto it on June 20, 1947.48

In expressing

his reasons tor vetoing the bill, the President called it
"unworkable."

The New York Times severely criticized the

President tor "inviting sabotage" by damaging the chances ot the
bill to prove itselt. 49

-

A letter to the Tribune expressed this

hostile opinion of the President's action:

"The inconsistency

of President Truman in his veto ot the Tart-Hartley Bill,
showed his absolute unfitness as the leading executive of our
country.".50
The House wasted no time in overriding the Presidential
veto.

The Times seemed to express surprise and disappointment

because the Senate did not tollow suit, in spite ot its previous
objections to the bill as it stood.

The Times' editorial

comments on the Senate debate were:
When the House of Representatives voted to override the
Presidential veto ot the Taft-Hartley Labor Management
Bill there s'emed to be no obstacle to similar action
in the Senate ••• This was not government by debate but
by an attempt to thwart theswill ot a majority of Oongress by power of nuisance. ~
Another Times editorial seemed impressed with the voting record
regarding the Taft-Hartley law, intimating that the measure must
therefore have substantial value.

~ewYOrk Times, Taft, p. 583.
49 .
New York Times, June 24, 1947, p. 22.
5OChicaso Tribune, June 26, 1947, p. 18.
51New York T1me~t June 22, 1947, p. 8, IV.
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Actuall Y throughout the whole debate which sent this
legislat l on to the President, the Taft-Hartley Bill
oommanded at all times majorities ot three of tour to
one in both the Senate and the House--a record of
vigorous bi-partisan support unmatched in the case of
any other controversial measure 0!2similar importance
enacted into law in recent years.'
~e Tribun~

had praise for the newly enacted bill and tor

Senator Taft, who the Tribune felt to be largely responsible tor
perfecting the measure.

"The bill as it emerged trom confer-

enoe and as it was eventually enacted is not a tough measure nor
is it a sott measur.. It iSj above all, a workable law ••• 53
The Time.s enumerated some of the basic provisions of the law,
optimistically stating that they, " ••• may change the entire
course of industrial relations. H54

The T£ibHQe shared these

sentiments in this statement:

"The bill will give the nation
the first tair and workable system ot labor relatlons ••• w55
Although the Labor-Management Relations Aot was passed on
June 23. 1947. it did not go into effect for

8

few months.

Comparatively little was said about the new law by the ,press
during the summer, perhaps in anticipation ot the real test ot
operation in the fall.

The opinions that were expressed during

the summer were those of speculation or tapering expressions ot
dissatisfaction with unions.
52New York T1me~t June 24, 1947, p. 22.
53Chicago Tribune, June 25. 1947, p. 16.

54New York Times, June 24, 1947, p. 4.
550hicaso Tribune, July 1, 1947. p. 16.

One letter to the Tribune explained why labor was dissatisfied with the "meritorious" Taft-Hartley Bill:

"The hue and

cry in labor ranks over the Taft-Hartley Bill is quite understandable when one considers its interference with the many
high-handed practices of unions.,,56

The ~imes. meanwhile,

expressed the 'opinion that the law would benefit the individual
workers if not the labor unions.
I! unions. as such, have lost soma freedom, workers
have gained some freedoms. The labor union has come
under a regulation comparable with that long e~.rcised
over the corporation--and for similar reasons./(

Reactions, possibly violent ones, were expected from labor.
However, the only group that responded with a strike to the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act was the United Mine Workers
Union.

The Tribune observed that:

Within 24 hours atter the Senate overrode the Truman
veto ot the Taft-Hartley Labor Law, John L. Lewis'
soft coal miners began to drift out of the mines •••
This country is not going to allow 400,000 coal miners
to blockade its bill.58
The Times was in agreement with this contention adding that:
"Elsewhere there have been no interruptions of work that could
be described as 'protest strikes' against the law. n59
560hicaso Tribune, June 26, 1947. p. 48.

57New York Time,. August 24, 1947, p. 8, IV.
>SChicngo fribune, June 26, 1947, p. 48.
59N1W Yo,rk Ti!e~. August 10, 1947. p. 7.
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When the law went into effect, the press again seemed
impressed with tbe promising results the law had in store.

This

attitude is expressed by a typical editorial in the Tribune.
The Taft-Hartley law bas been in effect for only a few
weeks, but already it bas some substantial achievements
to its credit •••• The underlying purpose ot Congress was
to impose responsibilities on unions to match their
privileges. It is still too early to say that Congress
has wholly succeeded in reaching this goal~Abut the evidences to date are definitely encouraging.ov
But merits of the new law seemed to ebb as summer turned to
fall.

The press became less sure in its praises of the Tatt-

Hartley and the public less clamorous for punishment of
striking workers and union leaders.

One letter to the Timts

found the Taft-Hartley inequitable in its treatment of workers
during a strike.
Employees who will be restrained by government inJunctions from carrying on a strike will certainly bridle
at the suggestion that there 1s equal protection under
our laws when the Taft-Hartley law permits employers,
as it does, to cut wages and reduce working conditions
during the injunction period when workers are encased
in.J.legal strait-j acketa. 61
The

~GW

York Times. expressing a great deal of faith in the

American sense of Justice. advised unions to be optimistic and
to expect the correction of the short-comings of the new law.
The labor union is an integral and necessary part of
our induat:Dial society. Its freedom, and its obligations are those essential to democracy. If experience
6OChicaso Tribune, September 4, 1947, p. 20.
61New York Times, November 27,1947, p. 30.

proves that the Taft-Hartley Act has violated any basic
freedoms--and in one or two instances it may have don.eso--then that error will be corrected. Labor can trust
the American public's sense of justice ••• Today, in spite
of all past mistakes. present doubts, and incidental
animosities. we can confidently wish the labor movement
well. 62
In another editorial the Times found fault with certain TattHartley provisions, adding that, a Congressional Committee to
study the Taft-Hartley in operation was a positive step in
appraisal of the new law.
Some changes, undoubtedly. like the tnon-communist'
atfidav.it and the uncritioal ban on political activity
by unions. will eventually be rejected or mGdi1'ied,
others may have to be de-emphasized or tightened up.
But,. in any case, we have now for the first time a
complete labor law. an administrative body to carry
out its provisions. and something unique and refreshing
in our legislative experience--a Oongressional Committee
to watch the law in operation and be prepared to recgm
mend changes it and when they seem to be oalled tor. ,

In the post-Tart-Hartley year

01'

1948, the letters and

editoI'ials on unions were far less common than in the past two

years.

Some· 01' the oomments which did appear were concerned

with specific provisions of the Taft-Hartley law.

For instance,

the Tiae. was 1n complete sympathy with organized labor on the
issue of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

An editor-

ial indicated that the provision,:tt ••• proh1biting a union
newspaper from commenting editorially on political candidates is

62New Ygrk fil!S, August 22, 1947, p. 14.
63New fork ~&m.s, September 1, 1947, p. 18.
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an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech ••• n64
On the whole, the law was not seen as disfunctional or
disrupti va of . normal union acti vi ties by the press.

-

The New

York Times reported the findings of a Oongressional Oommittee on
the six month progress of labor-management relations since the
passage of the Tart-Hartley in this way:
It finds that strikes, in number, in man-days of idleness and total number of workers affeoted. have steadily
declined in each successive month since the law became
fully operative last August 22 ••• But the six months
record, on the wholel deserves the committee's appraisal
that the law is work ng 'without undue hardships upon
employer or employee'--even-handed collective bargaining. 65

A month later,

~he

Tribupe had these observations to make

regarding the;1aw in operation:
It (Taft-Hartley) isn't in any sense a tough law. It
hasn't interf~ed with a single legitimate activity
of the unions. It hasn't forbidden them to organize
or to strike. W. do not recommend union busting laws
but nobody can p:revent their enactment if the present
abuses continue. bb
In June of 1948, after the Taft-Hartley had been in efrect ten
months. the fbl!S stated that the law had not been in effect
long enough to be due for major revisions, even though some
sections were admittedly "unworkable."

This editorial viewed

favorably the following Congressional decision:
64WtW Yori Times, March 16, 1948, p. 26.

65~!w Yori T!!.s, March 17. 1948, p. 24.
&GNew York Times, April ;, 1948, p. 12.

The Joint Congressional Committee on Labor-Management
Relations, which has been conducting hearings for the
past week or mOre on the proposed amendments to the
Taft-Hartley, had voted not to recommend any changes
at the present sessions. That means, in all probability, it will not be reopened before 1949. 67
Nearing the end ot the year, however, the Times published an
article by Joseph Loftus und9r this headline:

"One thing seems

certain---tbe labor law will not remain as is."68

A week later,

an editorial advocating another position was published; regarding the proposed amending action, the

Times

objected to 8n7

changes in the Taft-Hartley with this thought:

"We might as

well learn as soon as possible whether we still have re.presentative government in this country or whether Oongress can be
made to abdicate its functions. n69 This fluctuation indicated
an obvious instability in editorial policy and possibly in
public opinion as well.

In other editorials the Times did not

see the Taft-Hartley as equitable to management and labor.
exOerpt seems to explain that position:
Equality of treatment.under our law$ has been a oherished tradition and its basie toundation. The provisions ot the Taft-Hartley Law making it mandatory to
see injunctions when labor unions violate the law and
at the same tim. making it only discretionary when
employers violate the same law is an imbalance which
should be A8rrected be!ore any more labor unions are
destroyed. '/

67New York Tim!!, June 4, 1948, p. 22.
68N!W ~ork ~1mQs, November 21, 1948, p. 10, IV.
69New York Times, November 28, 1948, p. 8, IV.
70New York ~1m!S, October 4, 1948, p. 61
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In another editorial the Times showed satisfaction with clarifications equitably defining both labor and management's
positions.
Gradually, but surely, the rights of labor and management, respectively, under the Taft-Hartley Act, are
being brought into clearer definition and focus throUgh
the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board.yL
Although the spokesmen for organized labor seemed to be
unanimously against the Taft-Hartley Act, there were some
exceptions among the members.
appeared in the Tribun!%
individual worker.

A letter signed ·Union Member"

-This law guarantees freedom for the

It prevents many an unnecessary strike.

safeguards unions and their survival.
welfare ..... 72

It

It protects the public

The Democratic Party changed its opinion of the TattHartley Act as indicated by the new party platform for the
coming election.

It seems that a section of the platform called

for intensive study of the Taft-Hartley Act and poss1ble repeal
of the Act.

The Times was not in complete agreement with the

newly determined position of the Democratic Party.

It cautioned

the Democrats, reminding them of the last election results.
The 108 member resolutions committee of the Democratic
Party has now approve4 the recommendation of a suboommittee calling fir the outright repeal of the TattHartley Labor Act.?'
?lNew York Times, October 26, 1948, p. 30.
720hicaso Tribune. October 2?t 1948, p. 22.
73New York Tim,s, July 14. 194B. p. 22.
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Another editorial was suspicious of the motives of the Democratic Party in devising this change in policy.
This is a plain and unmasked bid for the 'labor vote'
in the 1948 campaign; but such a maneuver is hardly
consistent with the tact that 106 Democratic members
of the House ot Representatives voted to override the
President's veto of this ve£Y. legislation, whereas
only ?6 supported the veto.'l4
The T£ibune feared that the Democrats would disturb industrial
peace by allowing a return to the days when the Wagner Act was
supreme amoDg labor laws.
The Democrats say they want to go back to the days
when the Wagner Act governed labor relations, when
only employers could be guilty of untair labor
practices, and when this cO~Dtry experienced a succession of pro~racted strikes."
The results

olg~he

November elections, howevert were too

obvious to be misinterpreted.

A letter to the Timel analyzed

the meaning of the election in this way:
After one year of it (the taft-Hartley Act), the American people have shouted 'enough.' Under our democratic system that should mean something. Perhaps a
coalition of Dixiecrats and old guard Republicans can
still thwart the will ot the people. But it would not
be healthy for America, nor those millions throughout
the world wbo depend on the working success of democracy
as the final hope of salvation,76

74Ner York TimS•• July 15. 1948. p. 22.
750hiCISO Tribuna, July 17 t 1948. p. 6.
'lGtiew York Time!i. November 16, 1948, p. 28.

OHAPTER V
COMMUNIST INFIDTRATION INTO UNIONS
After the first World War, Communism created a political
problem of national scope and concern.

One of the targets of

Communism in the United States was the labor movement.

The

situation of the CIO, which required experienced organizers and
leaders, provided the .first major opportunity .for Communism to
entrench itself.

Taft appraised the Communist appeal to

organized labor in this way:
The formation of the CIO and the large demands its
successes imposed upon the relatively few experienced
leaders provided the Communists with an extremely
favorable opportunity. Absence of trained staff and
the lower level of trade union sophistication among
the large masses ot newly organized, gave Communist
activists a tine opportunity to gain a following in
the ranks of organized worker, who had almost unanimously rejected their appeal. 1
The AFL. at that time, was composed almost completely ot
skilled laborers who were not as easily impressed by Oommunism.
Therefore, the problem of Oommunism could not be discussed as an
issue applicable to the labor movement as a whole.

For

instance. in 1945 the AlL decided not to participate in the
International Trade Union Congress in London. a Communistic
1 Tatt, p. 625.
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labor organization. the Tribune noted this event by writing an
article in praise ot AFL labor pOlicies. 2
In 1946, Philip Murray, President ot the CIO. brought the
subject of Communism betore the Executive Board.

As a result.

Murray gained authority to penalize non-compliant CIO unions.
An investigating committee was tormed and a statement of policy
was adopted against interference by the Communist Party or
other political parties in the aftairs of the CIO.;

These

moves by the 010 were important in establishing organized
laborfs;"~'opposition to Communism.

Individual unions followed the

lead ot the CIO in attempting to rid themselves of Communistic
ties,
In 1947 the Chamber of Commerce made public its stud,y
entitled:

"Communism Within the Labor Movement," which the

public discovered to be of limited use 1n shedding light on the
aotivities of Communist. in the United States.

The study had

"

this to say:

As ot the present, said the Chamber, the problem ot
communism exists in scattered locals of the American
Federation ot Labor Unions, and in a more serious way
in international unions as well as locals of the Congress ot Industrial Organizations. 4
According to the New York Time!. William Green threatened
America with the

possibili~y
,

of labor rejecting democratic
'.

22g10alo Tribune, June 5. 1948, p. 16.
'Taft, p. 625.
4New York Timei. March 1" 1948, p_ 24.
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ideals tor Oommunism if the Taft-Hartley was passed. 5 It is
readily apparent, however, from these cc>mmenta also appearing in
the !1mel. about the possibilities of unification of the AFL and
010, that he is thoroughly opposed to Communism:

William Green. President of the AlL, said he was frankl~
not optimistic about achieving amalgamation soon ••• This
pessimism. he told reporters after a session of the
Executive Oouncil, sprang from the 'charaeter of the men
in control of' some of those organizations.· He reterred
specifically tg Oommunists in the Congress of Industrial
Organizations.
The TEibSR' intimated that Walter Reuther is in some way

sympathetic to Oommunism in the following editorial:
In the auto workers' international are two factions so

closely matched in strength that each strives to outdo the other in radicalism. 7(1n this case, radicalism
was used to mean Oommunism.)
The Tribune has been known to level the charge of "Oommunist" or radioal whenever it felt an occasion called for the
ultimate in vitriolic accusations,

The charge was applied

wherever the fribune found a situation which was partioularly
objectionable, that is, when it did not meet with the Tribune's
philosophY_

For instance, the Tr!bune felt that the "communis-

tic controlled" American Labor Party and the Democratic Party
lacked major differenoes. 8

~ew York T!m", January 26, 1948,

,w York f!les,

6N

p. 8,

IV.

September 12, 1948, p. 3.

7Chica~Ofribune, January 26, 1948. p. 20.
80hicaso Tribune. September 2, 1948. p. 8.

Occasionally, the letters to the editor which appeared in
the Tribune subscribed to a similar philosophy.

For instance,

this one was written by a union member who felt he was being
forced to vote against his conscience;
Telling the union men what to think and how to vote is
what was done by the Communists in Russia. Sidney
Hillman follows the party line. 9
The original Hartley Bill, later altered and eombined into
the Taft-Hartley Act. contained a clause which provided for
exclusion of tormer Communists trom union ottice.

The press

devoted quite a tew editorials to discussing this issue.

The

Timel. for instance. opposed the provision tor the reasons
expressed in the following commentary:
Some of the ablest opponents ot Communism in the
whole trade movement are ex-Communists who are now
disillusioned with that doctrine, and these men are
in a position to fight Oommunism all the more effectively for the very reason that they know its tricks.
To deny them positions ot leadership in the labor
movement simply because they were1sne Oommunists 1s
as short-sighted as it is unfair.
The tollowing letter was written in anewer to that editorial:
In tact,
help the
has come
in labor
nor want

your recommendations, it tollowed, would
Communist cause more than anything else that
out ot Washington since 1933. The Oommunists
unions are too numerous. They neither oan
to go und.rground.~

The section of the Taft-Hartley Act calling tor unions to
denounce Communist affiliation by signing an affidavit to that
9Cbicaso Tribun~t September 1, 1948, p. 26.
lON!W York Timel. May 22, 1948, p. 26.
llNew York Times, June 2, 1948, p. 24.
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effect caused a great deal of tribulation in labor circles.

An

editorial in the New! York
Times expressed this opinion:
"
We agree with this point of view. We should like to
point out, further, that bad laws also make hard cases,
and urge, as we have done before, that this section of
the Labor Act Taft-Hartley be amended so es 1:;0 clear
away any possible doubt that it has any intent of
12
interfering with the right to free expression of opinion.
However, a tew months later, the Times seemed to hold a different point ot view:
Oertainly, considering the subversive activities ot
international Oommunism. the question of alleged
Communist domination ot an American trade union is
an approp»iate subject of investigation, and certainly the political affiliations of the officials
of that union are relevant to the matter under inquiry.l}

In an article appearing tn the

~imes.

Louis Stark made this

positive observation on labor's practical philosophy toward
Communism:

"Resentment against Communist activities in the

labor movement is steadily increasing among the rank and tile of
American trade unionists. u14 !he R,hic!50 Tribune, on the other
hand, seems to have felt a number of unions were in a-position
to be accused of Oommunist affiliations.

Starting at the top of

the list, the leadership of the CIa falls into that category.
Neither does the rank and tile of the 010 share its
leaders' hopes that the American economic system will
be replaced by one drawn from Marxian blueprints ••••
12New Y;orlt time!1t June 26, 1948, p. 16.

13New York Tim!l. September l?, 1948. p. 24.
14New York Time., November 16, 1948. p. 10, IV.
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any politician who accepts either the endorsement or

the support 0fsthe CIO should be defeated for that
reason alone.

In other editorials the Tribune made similar statements regarding the leadership of the CIO.

"In all of this tumult within

the CIO's leadership there is not the slightest indication that
any ot the disputants has the slightest patriotio interest in
the United States. n16
The Packinghouse Workers were also under severe attack by
the TribHae.

One especially caustic editorial lett no. room for

mercy.
Some ot the local officials ot the packinghouse workers
are Oommunists ••• Many other leaders of the packinghouse
workers, including most ot the international officers,
are not Oommunists. The only plausible expl.nstion of
their behavior is that they are plain fools.~f
After the AFt faction settled

t~eir

dispute, the t£ibuns made a

distinction between the two groups ot packingbouse workers.
Mr. Ma~ch is district director of the striking CIO
union in Ohicago. He is also a member of the national
committee of the Oommunist Party ••• The AlL union ot
packinghouse workers found DO difficulty in coming to
terms on a new wage sca1e. 18
When the 010 strike failed, the Tribpne seemed to find justice
in the failure.
lSxhica60 Tribune, September 17, 1948, p. 20.
160hicago Tribune, February 27, 1948, p. 18.
17Chicaso Tribune, January 11, 1948. p. 20.
lSChicaso Tribune, Mareh 20, 1948, p. 14.
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The considerable Communist bloc in the union leadership, while evading responsibility tor the strike,
took an active part in organizing the lawlessness
which brought the union into national disrepute. l 9
One Tribune editorial seems to have separated its tactual
report from its conclusions on the basis that CIO unions can not
be completely tree trom Communist influence.

The 010, having

purged itself ot a good number ot its Oommunist bosses, still
remains a dangerous political and economic torce in Amerlca. 20
The public indignation aroused by the press seems to have
compelled at least one union to publicly clarity its position.
The tollowing letter was signed by the Aoting Recording Secret&r,1 ot the United Farm Equipment Workers:
We don·t feel that we should answer for the actions
ot any local except our own. Local 108, one of the
largest 010 locals in the City and the largest in the
Farm Equipment Workers Union, led the fight tor compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act. ~e were the first
to demand that our otficers sign non-Communist
affidavits ••••
The editors· comments: The National leadership ot
the UHEW h&~ consistently retlected Communist
1ntlu.nce.~J.

19Cb1c!60

Tr~bunet May 24,

1948, p. 14.

20Chicaso Tribune, August 22, 1948, p. 20.
21Ch1caso Tribune, September 4, 1948, p_ 8.,

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
A brief review and summation of the events occurring
during the tour years under observation should draw into a
better perspective the obvious and permit certain analyses to
be made using the evidence contained in the body of the thesis.
A definite trend appears which can be divided into four
stages.

The first stage is the wartime period, during whioh

organized labor was praised for its cooperation and contribution
to the war effort.

The press carried stories of the sacrifices

of the working man and the public expressions of praise and
gratitude of important government figures.

The wartime stories

were reported, however, with mixed emotions of sympathy and
reprimand.

The end of the war signaled an immediate shift in

positions and attitudes setting the stage for the second phase.
Organized labor felt justified in striking tor higher wages to
balance the price increases.

Management felt it had been

limited by government restrictions long enougb and demanded the
return of its management

righ~B.

The government, unprepared for

the end of the war, antagonized everyone by refusing to 11ft
wage and price controls.

Expressions of unfriendly publio

reactions were aimed at the striking unions who were
68
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complicating the process of production of sorely need civilian
goods.

Public indignation was most severely aroused by the

prospect of a coal shortage.
The calm at the end of the strike wave of 1946 was ended
when the pressure of price increases prompted organized labor to
demand wage increases again.

The.econd wave of' strikes was
<

'.,

. " ! .,,1-

announced half a year after the first wave ended.
The third stage was set by this new series of wage demands
and the ensuing work stoppages.

The result of this action on

the part of organised labor was a public demand for a reprisal
by the government.

The public saw to it that the retaliation

would occur by electing the conservative 80th Oongress.

The

Labor-Management Relations Act was passed with much haste over
the veto of President Truman in June ot 1947.
Although unions were in a state ot shock and contusion

8S

to how they should react, they did take heed and corrected 80me
of the faults pointed out by the Tart-Hartley Act.

For

instance, the accusation of "Communist" was~;~talc:.Jl
very seriously
,
and both houses ot organized labor commenced to purge themselves
ot the undesirable elements.
The initial shock of the magnitude of the negative legislation contained in the Taft-Hartley Act seemed to have hurt the
spirit of organized labor to the core.

However, these feelings

were apparently vented by the unions before the law actually
went into operation in the early fall of 1947.

Although the
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feeling of justification was initially prevalent in management
and government circles as expressed by the press, it soon gave
way to a certain degree of publio regret tor the hasty and vindictive measures included in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The fourth stage was brought on by expressions of regret
and statements by oertain sectors ot the government. like the
Democratic Party, indicating a desire to repeal, if not the
whole law, at least oertain objectionable seotions.

The later

part ot 1947 and allot 1948 were marked by tranquility and
almost a complete absence of unfriendly oomments by the press.
The growth ot union membership corresponds with these four
stages.

The tirst stage, during whioh public opinion can be

said to have veered toward a positive attitude, had a growth
rate ot l.5~.1

In the second stage, during which public opinion

grew steadily more negative, unions had a growth rate of

2~.

During the third stage, the climax ot negative feelings toward
unions, organized labor aocumulated an 8.S. growth in membership.

Finally, in the docile fourth stage, unions exhibited a

growth rate of a meager

0.5~.

These tigures indioate a negative oorrelation between
adverse public opinion and union growth.
more olosely examined.

This finding should be

Although adverse publio opinion did not

lThe four stages under discussion oorrespond with the
years 1945 through 1948. The growth rates quoted are those ot
Bernstein and are found on page 304 of his previously cited
study,.
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directly produce a downturn in union growth. it did result in
restricted labor legislation. the Taft-Hartley Act.

The events

immediately preceeding t as well as following. the passage of the
law really fall

into·~ts

shadow.

The public reacted to organized labor by enacting the TaftHartley Act; unions reacted to the law by significantly reducing
their growth rate.

The actions of the parties concerned fall

into a pattern of stimuli! and consequent reactions.
In examining the period in question, we find first that a
fertile growth atmosphere existed immediately after the war. which served to enhance the chances of growth.

The combination

of the favorable attitudes of the executive and judicial
branches of government and the post-war boom of the business
cycle serves to create a positive atmosphere,

Also, the

structure of union organization had been nurtured and
strengthened through the protection of wartime government
policies; and. the union membership had the added advantage of
being guided by aggressive leaders.
It is crucial to understand that both management and
organized labor felt deprived during the war.

Initially.

unions seemed to be the aggressors. since they were demanding
the changes. while managements might have settled tor the status
quo.

As the aggressive tendencies or unions

lncrease~tbe

.eeds

ot revenge and vengeanoe were planted in management, whioh. in
turn, sowed its feelings with the government.

The press, and,
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it must be assumed, the public, grew increasingly to favor tbe
management cause, which was borne out in the elections.

A

conservative Oongress was elected, whose ultimate goal was to
enact severely restricting legislation.

As this feeling of

animosity grew on the part of management and the public, unions
were necessarily placed in a defensive position.

Sinoe all

workers, not only organized workers. were feeling the pressure,
they joined forces against the hostile opposition.

As a

result, membership rates grew substantially as long as the
opposition continued the negative pressure.

When the negative

public opinion culminated in the passage of punitive legislation, negative expressions of opinion ceased.

The goal had been

achieved.
Anything happening after the passage of the Taft-Hartley
was obviously the reaction of the oonqueror and the conquered.
respectively.

The public seemed to express mixed emotions of

satisfaction for justice aChieved and a certain amount of
regret for revenge achieved.
bare; they had been defeated

The f.elings ot unions were lett
by

the severtt1 ot the measure

advocated by the public and enacted by the ·government.

Workers

were not anxious to carry their union banners very high;
instead, they suffered rebuke and disparagement silently and
passively during the year, which showed a severe downturn in
un.ion growth.
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The climate of public opinion as expressed by the press
had a definite influence on the events of this period.
Indirectly", the press is largely responsible for union growth
because of its rate in furthering the efforts of parties concerned with passing the Taft-Hartley Law.

The two newspapers

differed in their editorial positions on specific issues; however. the

tre~4

was undoubtedly

during the two

p~management

years preceeding the Taft-Hartley Act.

That is not to say that

either the Tim!, or the T,r1b9l! were biased.

They merely

reflected and enhanced the public thought on union-management
issues.
Both dailies spurred the Oongress by editorializing on the
need ot baste to pass the law.

Both newspapers also round

clauses worthy of criticism, but seemed to express the thought
that these objectionable clauses merely needed slight editing
or simply re-wording.

In essence, both the Times and Tribuae

were in agreement abGut the necessity and the value of the '1'aftHartley Act.

The Portal-to-Portal issue also obtained complete

agreement between the two papers.

Tbe Smith-Connally Act was

one issue which mucked a steady tirade from the

~im!lt

but very

little reaction from the Tribune.
The Oommunist issue was unique in its position with the
newspapers.

The Tribune was very staunch in its disapproval ot

eVerything that was'; tinged by Communism.

It sometimes made the

assumption that highly objectionable (to the Tribune) situations

?4
were Communist inspired.

The

Time~.

on the other hand. was not

quite so intense in its criticisms of organized labor's pitralls
into Communism.
Certainly any strong statement made by a large metropolitan
newspaper will cause concern and comment.

When a newspaper

feels it should back the public in a "cause." this form
media becomes ver.ypowerful.

or

news

To reiterate. the two newspapers

were not directly responsible for reflecting the sort of public
opinion which caused fluctuations in union growth directly.
One can be assured. however. that the climate of public opinion
leading to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the resultant
reactions of organized labor were reflected by these two
newspapers.
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